NHS apologises and admits Palantir have access to identifiable patient data
摘要
NHS England 就此前发布的《数据保护影响评估》中不准确的表述道歉，承认 Palantir 等供应商员工可通过联邦数据平台（FDP）访问可识别的患者数据。国家数据监护人 Nicola Byrne 要求澄清后，NHS 回应称供应商访问受控且基于运营需要，目前有 3 名 Palantir 工程师拥有管理级访问权限，另有 33 名其他供应商工程师有项目级访问权限。NHS 强调这些访问仅用于技术支持，不用于供应商自身目的。同时，英国议会科学、创新与技术委员会建议政府行使合同终止条款，在 2027 年 3 月退出与 Palantir 的合作，并开发内部替代方案或选择其他英国供应商。
荐读理由
该事件揭示了政府技术采购中供应商数据访问权限的透明度问题，对做数据产品或与公共部门合作的创业者有警示：即使合同合规，DPIA 等文档的准确性也可能成为信任危机导火索，需提前设计清晰的访问控制与披露机制。
原文
The central health service body has acknowledged the inaccuracy of claims previously made in a transparency document which indicated that only NHS staff were able to see such sensitive information
NHS England has issued an apology after admitting that employees from Palantir and other suppliers can access identifiable information related to individual patients via the Federated Data Platform.
In its previously published Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) – a transparency document that is a statutory requirement for many public services engaged in the processing of citizens’ sensitive personal data – the NHS had claimed only health-service staff could access identifiable individual info via the FDP.
Recent reports, however, have claimed that representatives from the platform’s core supplier, Palantir, can also access this sensitive data. Following the emergence of these stories, independent adviser and scrutiniser Dr Nicola Byrne – who holds the post of National Data Guardian – wrote to the NHS requesting clarity on whether or not external contractors and supplier staff could see patient info.
In a newly published response, NHS England stressed that – outside of the inaccurate DPIA – “we have always been clear publicly and on our website that authorised users from the supplier will be granted access to data”.
But the statement from the health service went on to admit “within the DPIA we referred to only NHS England staff having access to directly identifiable patient data [but]… in fact some suppliers working for NHS England do have controlled access”.
“We recognise that the DPIA contained an error in how it described supplier access to data so we are correcting that error, and we apologise for any confusion this has caused,” the NHS said.
Related content
Palantir’s £250m government deal ‘represents a vote of confidence in the UK’, minister says
Government to spend up to £20m on ‘border flow’ contract with CIA-backed big data firm Palantir
Palantir platform ‘will be more secure than anything currently used in NHS’, minister says
Access is provided via the FDP’s National Data Integration Tenant system, as part of supporting which three Palantir engineers “currently have administrative-level access to the NDIT”, while “a further 33 engineers from a variety of suppliers have more limited project-specific access to work on specific data sets and tasks assigned by NHS England including writing code and assuring the development of new products”.
“In all cases they do not have permission to use the data for their own purposes – their role is strictly limited to supporting the safe running and maintenance of the platform,” the health service added. “The access is granted based on operational need and is time limited therefore the numbers can fluctuate over time. Within NDIT, engineers, operating under the instruction of NHS England, could access identifiable and de-identifiable patient data, however this would only be to provide specific technical support – patient data is not routinely accessed.”
In response to the NHS clarification, data guardian Dr Byrne said that she and her team will “continue to engage with the programme in our independent advisory role, providing advice on its documentation, transparency materials… [and] will continue to provide challenge where necessary, and advocate for practices that build and maintain public and professional trust”.
She added that “we continue to strongly support the programme’s ambition” – but acknowledged the prevalence and vehemence of concerns regarding the FDP, and the presence of its primary tech supplier.
“The intensity of interest and strength of public feeling on this issue appear to reflect not only how deeply many people care about the use of their data, and its confidentiality, but also continuing concern amongst some about Palantir’s role in the NHS,” Byrne said. “This topic has always been to some extent political. As such, people have a range of views. And public, professional and media scrutiny has only increased over time. This means that accuracy and transparency must remain central priorities for the NHS FDP programme. This incident has shown how quickly confidence erodes if the ‘no surprises’ principle [of NHS data use] is not upheld when it comes to who can access people’s data, and why.”
MPs on the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee recently issued a report stating that “Palantir shouldn’t play such a significant role in the UK public sector”, and naming the vendor “as the most concerning example of the public sector’s growing reliance on a small number of major technology providers, [also] including Microsoft and Amazon Web Services”.
The committee issued unequivocal guidance that government should exercise a break clause enabling the NHS to exit the FDP engagement in March 2027 – and should then “either develop an in-house replacement or seek an alternative UK provider”.
这条对你有帮助吗？